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The Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer: Can It Keep
Us All from Needing Hats, Sunglasses,
and Suntan Lotion?,
By PAUL R.

TOURANGEAU

Member of the Class of 1989

I.

INTRODUCTION

"In the earth's earlier days, before the ozone layer had formed, animals and plants got along nicely by living underwater. It was not until
the ozone layer was in place to absorb the UV-B that living things were
able to crawl out of the primordial slime and onto land." 2 The ozone
layer is our protective shield, but studies indicate that it is depleting, and
that the depletion has a correlation to the amount of certain chemicals
that we produce and use on earth. As a 1986 National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) study puts it: "[s]ociety is conducting a
giant experiment on a global scale by increasing the concentration of
1. Certain generic terms will be used throughout this Note:
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Final Act, 1987
(hereinafter Protocol). This is the Protocol, or regulatory device that resulted from the 1985
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, and it is the focus of this Note. The
Protocol itself has yet to receive an official UN citation number at the time of this writing.
The 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. This is the original
international agreement to work towards global protection of the ozone layer. It calls for
cooperation and exchange of information on solving the ozone problem and developing
alternative substances. It also calls for a Protocol to be drafted and signed. The Convention
requires 20 instruments of ratification or acceptance before it comes into force, which has yet
to occur. The Montreal Protocol cannot come into force until the Vienna Convention comes
into force (hereinafter Convention). See Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer, reprintedin 14 ENVTL. PoL'Y & L. Nos. 2-3, at 72-77 (1985).
"UNEP" is the United Nations Environmental Programme. This entity is largely
responsible for bringing together the parties to this Protocol.
"ODP" refers to a substance's ozone depletion potential. This figure estimates a
chemical's relative capacity to destroy ozone molecules.
2. Shell, Weather Versus Chemicals, ATLANTIC, May 1987, at 28. UV-B is an acronym
for a specific type of ultraviolet radiation blocked by the ozone layer, which poses a threat to
our health and welfare when we are exposed in large doses. Id.
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global community recently responded to this threat in a fashion never
before seen. An international agreement, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, intends to equitably reduce the

amount of certain gases sent into the atmosphere which are known to
destroy the ozone layer. The Protocol is unique in that it was prospec-

tive when it was signed, anticipating the problem of ozone depletion
before serious damage had occurred.4 Today, however, we know that we
are facing the specter of serious global health and environmental

problems due to an already substantial depletion in the ozone layer.5
One hopes that this landmark agreement will prove capable of protecting
the ozone layer in the face of the present threat, and go on to set a prece-

dent for new agreements which address more complex global environmental issues, such as the global greenhouse, deforestation, and acid rain
problems.6
This Note focuses on selected aspects of the Protocol.7 First, it will
explain the scientific process which causes ozone depletion. Next, it will
discuss the chronology of actions taken to address the threat of ozone

depletion. The Note will then focus on several aspects of the Montreal
Protocol, analyzing whether the structure and content of the document

and control measures are workable, and if they will effectively deal with
the looming problem of large scale ozone depletion.8 The analysis of the

agreement's control measures will include how and which chemicals are
3. NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, PRESENT STATE OF
KNOWLEDGE OF THE UPPER ATMOSPHERE, AN ASSESSMENT REPORT, NASA Reference

Publication 1162 (1986) (available through NASA, Washington, D.C.).
4. CHEM. & ENG. NEWS, Sept. 21, 1987, at 7 (quoting R. Benedick, U.S. chief negotiator
for the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer).
5. See Shabecoff, Most Authoritative Study Yet Shows Declining Ozone Layer, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 16, 1988, at Yl, col. 4 (hereinafter Authoritative Study); Gleick, Even with Action
Today, Ozone Loss Will Increase, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1988, at Y1, col. 1 (hereinafter Ozone
Loss) (series of articles relating the findings of a newly issued NASA sponsored study finding
significant current depletion of the ozone layer).
6. See A. Miller & I. Mintzer, The Sky Is the Limit: Strategiesfor Protectingthe Ozone
Layer 1, World Resources Institute Research Report 3 (Nov. 1986) (available through the
World Resources Institute).
7. Areas that this Note will not address but that deserve attention in some future analysis include: the use of "Industrial Rationalization" as a means of keeping economies of scale
while cutting back production globally; the inability of any party to the Protocol to make
reservations, or opt out of certain clauses; the provisions for the Protocol's entry into force,
and, most importantly, the lack of an enforcement mechanism for noncomplying parties.
8. This note intends to take an objective look at the provisions written in the Protocol,
which were based on the predominantly speculative information available through September
16, 1987. With the information available as of the time of this writing, it is probable that a
much more drastic Protocol would have been agreed upon. See Shabecoff, Industry Acts to
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regulated, and how concessions are made for lesser developed countries
and the Soviet Union. The trade restriction provision's ability to protect
the parties and effectuate the agreement will also be discussed. Finally,
the Note will focus on the adjustment mechanisms for the Protocol's
control measures, and on the Protocol's provision allowing parties to act
unilaterally to take more stringent action to protect the ozone.

II. BACKGROUND
A.

The Ozone Layer
The "ozone layer," 9 which exists in the earth's stratosphere at an

altitude between 12 and 50 kilometers,10 is a concentration or layer of the
ozone molecule, 03. The primary function of the ozone layer is to absorb

incoming ultraviolet rays (UV-B) from the sun," thus protecting the
earth.
The ozone layer is destroyed by certain chemical compounds developed by man, such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFC's) and halons, which
have chlorine or bromine as part of their chemical makeup. Both of
these types of compounds are resilient, and do not decompose or oxidize
in the lower atmosphere once they have been released.1 2 Over a 7 to 10

year period following their emission, 3 these compounds drift up into the
stratosphere where they are broken down by the sun's ultraviolet rays,
releasing the individual chlorine or bromine atom." The chlorine or broCurb Peril in Ozone Loss, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1988, at YI, col. 1, YII. col. 3 hereinafter
Industry Acts (quoting Rafe Pomerance, Senior Associate at the World Resources Institute).
9. For a good discussion of the chemical dynamics of the ozone issue see, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RISKS OF STRATOSPHERIC MODIFICATION, OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Vol. 1, Executive Summary (Jan. 1987) (Avail-

able through the EPA) (hereinafter ASSESSMENT OF THE RISK); Ember, Layman, Lepkowski
& Zurer, Tending the Global Commons, CHEM. & ENG. NEwS, Nov. 24, 1986, at 14-64 (hereinafter Ember); Rowland, A Threat to EarthrProtectiveShield, 12 E.P.AJ. No. 10, at 4, Dec.
1986 (hereinafter Rowland); Miller & Mintzer, supra note 6. For a general discussion of the
issue see, Brodeur, Annals of Chemistry in the Face of Doubt, NEW YORKER, June 9, 1986, at
70; Shell, supra note 2; 12 E.P.A.J. No.10, (Dec. 1986) (a collection of essays covering all
aspects of the ozone depletion issue); Lemonick, The HeatIs On, TIM, Oct. 19, 1987, at 5867 (hereinafter Lemonick).
10. See Ember, supra note 9, at 16.
11. Id. at 17.
12. See Rowland, supra note 9, at 5. These reactions are extremely complex and not fully
understood, but the relationship between chlorine or bromine and ozone depletion appears to
be clear. The materials cited in note 9 provide good explanations of the forces at work.
13. Because these gases take so long to actually reach the atmosphere, we are only now
seeing results from our global emissions which occurred several years ago, and our present
emissions will not impact the ozone layer for several years. Ozone Loss, supra note 5.
14. Id.; Rowland, supra note 9, at 5.
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mine atom then destroys ozone molecules by reacting with or pulling one
of the oxygen atoms from the ozone, 03 molecule.' 5 Eventually, the
chlorine atom is again left by itself and goes on to destroy another ozone
molecule in the same fashion, a chain reaction that gives the chlorine or
bromine molecule the name "free radical." 16 A single chlorine atom is7
able to sustain this chain reaction for approximately 75 to 110 years.'
Therefore, while the stockpile of these atoms in the stratosphere grows in
direct proportion to their annual emission, the destructive potential to
the ozone layer grows exponentially."i Because these destructive molecules can possibly last a century while destroying ozone, an immediate 85
percent reduction in the emissions of these compounds would be required
in order to freeze the amount of CFC's in the atmosphere today. 19
B.

Destructive Chemicals

There are many applications for CFC's in the world today. They
are used as the refrigerant in air conditioners and refrigerators, as propellants for aerosols, solvents or cleaners in the microch:ip industry, as blowing agents in many foam or insulation production applications, as
freezing agents in the food industry, and as sterilants in the medical
field.20 Two compounds, CFC's 11 and 12, account for 80 percent of the
emissions of ozone depleting substances, and will be two of the chemicals
regulated under the Protocol. 2 ' CFC's are much favored by industry because they are neither toxic nor flammable, so they greatly reduce the
risk of industrial accidents. They are also extremely stable in chemical
reactions. 2 In the United States CFC's may represent up to $28 billion
per year and 715,000 jobs, which indicates that elimination of these
chemicals can cause a potentially large economic disruption.3 However,
in the face of new scientific data illustrating damage to the ozone layer,
and with the existence of the Montreal Protocol's mandates for reducing
15. See Ember, supra note 9, at 17.
16. Id. A single chlorine atom can destroy as many as 100,000 ozone molecules before it
is spent. Rowland, supra note 9, at 5.
17. See Rowland, supra note 9, at 5.
18. See ASSESSMENT OF THE RISKS, supra note 9.
19. See U.S. DEPT.OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS CURRENT POLICY No. 931,
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO PROTECT THE STRATOSPHERIC OZONE LAYER 1 (1987) (here-

inafter U.S. Dept. of State). An 85% reduction in emissions would only freeze the quantity, or
the stockpile, of the destructive compounds in the stratosphere. The destructive potential of
that stockpile is still exponential to its size.
20. See Ember, supra note 9, at 47.

21. See ASSESSMENT OF THE RISKS, supra note 9, at 8, para. 1.
22. See Ember, supra note 9, at 47.
23. Id. at 48 (statement of figures from the Alliance for a Responsible CFC Policy).
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production, industry has found that developing viable replacements for
CFC's may be easier than they originally complained about.24 Emissions
of CFC's into the atmosphere have averaged just under one million tons
per year since 1974.25 Due to these emissions, the chlorine content in the
air is believed to have risen from 0.6 parts per billion volume (ppbv) prior
to 1900, to 3.5 ppbv currently, with an estimated current rate of increase
of more than 1.0 ppbv per decade.2 6 Since the signing of the Protocol,
experts have determined that because of the length of time it takes these
compounds to reach the stratosphere, the allowable emissions under the
Protocol, future emissions from past uses like refrigerators, and the longevity of these compounds in the atmosphere, atmospheric content of
these compounds will rise to approximately 6-8 ppbv, double the present
content, before they will begin to decline.27 Global atmospheric concentrations of ozone depleting substances have increased recently, ranging
from 5-10 percent annually for CFC's, to 23 percent annually for halons,
the most volatile of the ozone depleters. 28 These figures illustrate the
substantial and rapid increase of the total stock of these gases in the upper stratosphere every year.
The correlation between the presence of these compounds in the
stratosphere and ozone destruction can be illustrated by the Antarctic
"ozone hole." A study of this phenomenon in the fall of 1987 recovered
data showing a 50 percent decline in the level of ozone over the polar ice
cap, up from the dramatic 40 percent decline of the previous fall.2 9 In
regard to the 1987 data collection, NASA meteorologist Robert Watson
stated, "It is clear that an oxide of chlorine is crucial to destruction of
antarctic ozone, and CFCs are the main source. Reactive forms of chlorine over Antarctica reached levels from 100 to 500 times higher than
normal as the ozone hole formed." 3 This study establishes the clear relationship between chlorine, bromine, and ozone depletion. It is important to note, however, that the Antarctic correlation cannot be, and was
24. See Industry Acts, supra note 8.

25. See Rowland, supra note 9, at 5.
26. Id.

27. Ozone Loss, supra note 5.
28. See ASSESSMENT OF THE Rism, supra note 9, at 2, para.2, 8.
29. See Petit,ScientistsSay Ozone Hole Growing overAntartic, San Francisco Chron., Oct.
1, 1987, at Al, col. 3 (hereinafter Scientists); Shabecoff, Antartic Ozone Loss is Worsening,N.Y.
Times, Oct. 1, 1987, at Al, col. 1 (hereinafter Loss Worsening); Lemonick, supra note 9, at 59.
Recently scientists testified before Congress that they now fear for their health when studying
the ozone hole in Antarctica because of the amount of ultraviolet-B radiation (UV-B) that they
are exposed to. See Sullivan, Ozone Hole Raising Concernsfor Scientists'Safety, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 28, 1987, at Y9, cal. 1.
30. Scientists, supra note 29, at A28, col 3.
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not for the purposes of the Protocol, directly translated into impact over
the more populated, temperate climates. This is because the two climates
effect ozone depletion somewhat differently. 3 It must be noted at this
point, that the Montreal Protocol was spurred by environmental models
that forecasted a 1 percent depletion in the ozone under the Protocol
provisions - an amount that would still generate a significant increase in
serious global health problems, like skin cancer and cataracts. 32 Alarmingly, since the Protocol's signing in September of 1987, a 100 member
team of scientists, sponsored by NASA, has reached a consensus that
there exists at this time an average loss of 1.7 percent of the ozone in the
latitudes between Florida and Pennsylvania, and 3 percent in the latitudes between Pennsylvania and mid-Canada. 3 s These decreases may be
mitigated for a brief period by temporary, cyclical solar activity that enhances ozone production, but the depletion is expected to follow the
same trend unless emissions of the destructive substances are abated.
Even this will not reduce the depletion for many decades to come.34
Based on these figures and under the Protocol as it is written at this time,
scientists project the present ozone damage to grow by a factor of 3, to an
approximate 10 percent loss of the ozone layer in some regions.35 Moreover, the ozone hole over Antarctica, with its 50 percent level of depletion, has now been detected to be affecting populated regions of South
America. 36 The specter of ozone depletion is no longer prospective, it
exists at this time.
C. Effects from Depletion of the Ozone Layer
The decrease, in stratospheric ozone allows more ultraviolet radiation, or UV-B to reach the earth's surface. Experts estimate that for
every 1 percent depletion of the ozone layer there is,
a corresponding 2
percent increase in the amount of UV-B that reaches the earth's surface.37 UV-B is known to cause damage to our health and environment,
and increased exposure to these rays can lead to widespread and substan31. The Antarctic ozone hole seems to be an isolated phenomenon because of the unique

atmospheric conditions of the region. See generally Ember, supra note 9. However, the level
of trace gases like chlorine from CFC's and bromine from halons during the period of the
ozone hole clearly illustrates the possible correlation between the gases and ozone depletion.
See Rowland, supra note 9, at 5.
32. Ozone Loss, supra note 5, at Y17, col. 2.
33. AuthoritativeStudy, supra note 5, col. at Y13; Ozone Loss, supra note 5 at Y17 col. 1.
34. Ozone Loss, supra note 5, at Y17 col. 3.
35. Id. at Y17, col.4.
36. Id. at Y17, col.3., AuthoritativeStudy, supra note 5, at Y13, col, 1; see also supra note
9 and accompanying text.
37. Ozone Loss, supra note 5, at Y17, col.4.
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tial harm.3" The effect of heightened UV-B on health can be devastating, 3 9 causing increased cases of skin cancer, cataracts, retinal
deterioration, and possible deterioration of the human immune system."
In 1986, 23,000 Americans contracted malignant melanoma skin cancer,
of whom approximately 6,000 died. Another 2,000 Americans died from
nonmelanoma skin cancer.4 1 If current trends of CFC use continue, as
many as 154 million cases of nonmelanoma skin cancer, and 780,000
cases of melanoma skin cancer could occur in the U.S. by the year 2075,
resulting in approximately 3.2 million more deaths than would occur
otherwise.4 2 There could be as many as 18.2 million additional cases of
cataracts in the U.S. by the year 2075 if emissions stay at their present
levels.4 3 Studies have also shown that increased exposure to UV-B can
suppress the immune system, which could lead to chronic outbreaks of

diseases. 44
The environmental effects of increased UV-B exposure may include
significant decreases in agricultural yields, and unpredictable alterations
in weather and precipitation patterns. 45 Heightened UV-B exposure has

also been shown to increase plankton mortality in the ocean, which could
have broad implications on the marine food chain. 46 Further, the ozone

depleting compounds are believed to contribute to the global greenhouse
problem, in which gases absorb reflected UV radiation, retain the heat,
38. For an extensive discussion of the impacts from increased UV-B radiation, see Assessment of the Risks, supra note 9.
39. Ember, supra note 9, at 15.
40. See Mintzis, Skin Cancer: The Pricefor a Depleted Ozone Layer, 12 EPA JOURNAL
No. 10, at 8, Dec. 1986; Assessment of the Risks, supra note 9, at 27-36, 54-55; and articles
contained in, EPA, EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN STRATOSPHERIC OZONE AND GLOBAL CLIMATE, Vol. 1, Overview at 129-45, 147-64, 1986 (available through EPA) Ozone Loss, supra
note 5, at Y17, cols. 4-5.
41. See Mintzis, supra note 40, at 7.
42. See STRATOSPHERIC PROTECTION PROGRAM, OFFICE OF PROGRAM DEVELOPmENT,
OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: PROTECTION OF STRATOSPHERIC OZONE, Vol. I, at ES-4, 1987

(hereinafter REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS) (figures are based on a 50% decrease in the

ozone layer by the year 2099)(available through EPA). See also D. Dudek, Stratospheric
Ozone Depletion: The Casefor PolicyAction, at 18, (Sept. 1986) (available through the Environmental Defense Fund) (quoting a National Cancer Institute study which reports that with a
5.5% depletion of the ozone layer, there will be 114,500 new cases of skin cancer annually in
the United States by the year 2025); ASSESSMENT OF THE RISKS, supra note 9, at 54.
43. See REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 42, at ES-4.

44. Id. at 2-12, para. 17.
45. See Dudek, supra note 42, at 14-15; Assessment of the Risks, supra note 9, at 4549;
see also EPA, supra note 40, at 165-73; Ozone Loss, supra note 5 at Y17, cols. 4-5.
46. See REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 42 at 2-12, para. 20; see also As-

SESSMENT OF THE RISKS, supra note 9, at 38-40; EPA, supra note 40, at 175-91.
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and thereby slowly increase the earth's ambient temperature. A slight
increase in this temperature could have a devastating effect on our environment. 47 For example, studies have found that the sea level could rise
by 10-20 centimeters by the year 2025, and by 55-100 centimeters by the
year 2075.48 It must be understood that the impacts from such substantial tampering with the environmental homeostasis is far from accurately
predictable, and the ramifications are so extensive that many scientists
will not even begin to try to theorize on what results will occur; "[b]y
changing the contents of the earth's atmosphere, humans are delivering a
sharp kick to a machine that scientists now believe [to be] capable of
rapid and unstable responses." 49
Attempts have been made to quantify, in terms of U.S. dollars, the
impact of not regulating ozone depleting compounds, as compared to
completely phasing out their use.50 For example, a present freeze of CFC
use would result for the United States in a present cost value for implementation of approximately $6.8 billion by 2075.1 For a CFC reduction
of 80 percent and a halon freeze at 1986 levels, the present cost value in
such a regulatory action would be $34.0 billion by 2075.52 Comparatively, the savings obtained from fewer deaths and sicknesses due to skin
cancer through 2075, under the above two regulatory options, has been
quantified at a present value of $2.8 trillion to $6.4 trillion.53 Although it
is logical and prudent to undertake a cost-benefit analysis when regulating a resource, these figures illustrate how ludicrous such an analysis can
be in a situation like ozone depletion, where our very existence is at
stake. The bettei t6rm would be "risk-benefit" analysis. Here, the benefits to be obtained are avoidance of catastrophic health and environmental damage. The risk, on the other hand, is becoming increasingly larger
as we obtain clear evidence of the relationship between chlorine, bromine, and ozone depletion. In situations like ozone depletion, or the
global greenhouse effect, there is an asymmetry of risk5 4 obviously
47. See generally 12 EPA JOURNAL No. 10, Dec. 1986; see also ASSESSMENT OF THE
RISKS, supra note 9, at 5, 21 para.18, 42-44. For a detailed summary of current knowledge on
global warming see EPA, supra note 40, at 199-328. It is hoped this Protocol will be an
example for solving the potentially greater problem of the Global Greenhouse effect.
48. See REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 42, at 213, para. 23.
49. Ozone Loss, supra note 5, at Y17 col.1.
50. See REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 42, at ES4-6.

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at ES-6.
Id.
Id. at ES-4.
Interview with Mr. Alan Miller, formerly with the Natural Resource Defense Coun-

cil, involved with ozone protection and presently consulting on environmental issues and
teaching law at Delaware Law School.
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weighted on the risk side, and economic cost must be placed at the bottom, if not off, the list of factors to be considered.
I.

ACTIONS TO PROTECT THE OZONE LAYER

In 1974 Dr. Rowland and Dr. Molina, atmospheric scientists, published an article describing the relationship between free chlorine atoms
in the stratosphere and their ability to destroy the earth's protective
shield, the ozone layer.5 5 This article touched off a wave of international
interest and concern about the ozone layer. In 1976, the United Nations
Environmental Programme (UNEP) recognized the problem as one
needing international attention.5 6 In 1977 Congress amended the Clean
Air Act and directed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
protect the ozone layer once the EPA Administrator found a sufficient
relationship between any chemical and stratospheric ozone depletion.
In March 1978 the EPA, the Consumer Products Safety Commission,
and the FDA promulgated rules under the Toxic Substances Control Act
which banned the use of CFC's in non-essential aerosols.5 8 In 1980,
UNEP called for reduction in production and use of CFC's 11 and 12.19
In that same year the EPA issued an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking for non-aerosol uses of CFC's under section 157 of the
Clean Air Act,' but never went forward on the proposed rulemaking,
citing "insufficient information" to act.61
In 1985 the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer (Convention) was signed, calling for international cooperation on
research of the ozone problem and development of substitute chemicals.
The Convention also called for a future protocol that would regulate
chemicals threatening the ozone layer.6 2 In May of 1986 the Natural
Resource Defense Council (NRDC) settled a lawsuit against the EPA,
securing action under Section 157(b) of the Clean Air Act by accepting a
date by which EPA must decide either to promulgate regulations to pro55. M. Molina and F.S. Rowland, StratosphericSink for Chlorofluormethanes Chlorine
Atom-Catalysed Destruction of Ozone, 249 NATURE No. 5460, at 810-12.
56. See OZONE PROTECTION CHRONOLOGY 1, EPA document OESENH 60 (Sept. 21,
1987) (available through EPA).
57. Clean Air Act, sec. 157, 42 U.S.C. sec. 7450 (1987).
58. 21 C.F.R. sec. 2,125 (1982). The applicable statute is the Toxic Substances Control

Act, 15 U.S.C. see. 2601 (1982).
59.

OZONE PROTECTION CHRONOLOGY, supra note

56,

at

1.

60. See 45 Fed. Reg. 66726 (1980).
61. See Miller & Mintzer, supra note 6, at 21.

62. See Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, reprintedin 14 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY & L. Nos. 2-3, 72, 72-77 (May 1985). The Convention is not yet in force
and will require 20 instruments of ratification or acceptance before it will become effective.
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tect the ozone, or, to make a finding that no regulation is needed.63 The

United States ratified the Vienna Convention in August 1986.1 4 During
the period of the Vienna Convention and following, Congress held numerous hearings investigating the ozone issue and reviewed various

pieces of legislation designed to regulate for ozone protection. 65 Prior to
1987 all efforts to protect the ozone layer from depletion failed to result
in any real global activity or law to reduce the amount of destructive
compounds being injected into the ozone layer.

Efforts to obtain' an international protocol finally succeeded on September 16, 1987, when the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete

66
the Ozone Layer (Protocol) was signed by 24 of 4.9 nations present.

The EPA conveniently responded to NRDC v. Thomas on December 14,
1987, with a proposed rulemaking on chemicals that deplete the ozone
layer. This was effectively the U.S. response to the Montreal Protocol.6 7
EPA favors an "allocated marketable rights" approach to effectuating its
obligations under the Protocol,68 and can already impose fines on manufacturers and industrial consumers of $25,000 per day for failure to deliver production and consumption statistics. 69 The United States Senate
ratified the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer by an 83 to 0 vote on March 14, 1988.70

This Protocol is an international agreement to globally reduce the
emission of substances known to harm the ozone layer. It contains clear
measures mandating, most importantly, that each party nation reduce
production and consumption of ozone'depleting substances, cooperate in
63. See Natural Resource Defense Council Inc. v. Thomas, Civ. Act. No. 84-3587
(D.D.C. May 17, 1986), modified (D.D.C. May 19, 1987). The basis for this lawsuit was the
EPA's failure to make a finding of any kind after their proposed rulemaking. The proposed
rulemaking triggered an obligation to make a determination to regulate or decide that there Is
no significant impact, and the EPA agreed to this in the settlement agreement.
64. See D. Gushee, Clean Air Act: Protection of the Stratospheric Ozone Layer 5 Cong.
Research Service (Sept. 28, 1987) (Issue Brief, code IB87084.)
65. For a listing 6f the recent hearings, see id. at 11-12.
66. N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1987, at Al, col.2. The Protocol itself has yet to receive an
official UN citation number at the time of this writing.
67. See Environmental Protection Agency, Protection of Stratospheric Ozone; Final Rule
and Proposed Rule, 52 Fed.Reg. 47,486 1987 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 82) proposed Dec.
14, 1987 [hereinafter EPA: Final Rule]. For a description of how the various Parties to the
Protocol are choosing to effectuate the provisions of the Protocol, see BNA Int'l Env. Rptr.,
'(March 9, 1988).
68. 52 EPA: Final rule, supra note 67, at 47,500. This method consists of giving present
manufacturers; and industrial consumers of CFC's and halons rights to produce or consume at
various quantities (according to the Protocol), and the "rights" can be sold as the holder
desires.
69. Id. at 47,487.
70. N.Y.Times, Mar. 15, 1988, at Y19, col. 4.
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developing alternative substances, and prohibit or restrict trade in these
substances between parties and non-parties. It also contains measures to
modify the provisions of the Protocol if the situation merits this. As
noted earlier, the drafters believed theit harm to the ozone layer could be
avoided by enforcement of the Protocol as signed September 16, 1987.
The new scientific data issued in March of 1988 drastically alters perceptions regarding ozone depletion, clearly illustrating already present damage.7 1 This discovery puts enormous pressure on the Protocol to respond
to the present knowledge surrounding ozone protection, as it was
designed to do. Whether the Protocol can live up to its goal of ozone
protection will be proven with time. This Note generally explores two
areas, one,' how legally effective the written provisions of the Protocol
will be in confronting ozone depletion; and two, the efficacy of the Protocol's provisions as an instrument for international environmental
protection.

IV. ANALYSIS
A.

Article 2, Control Measures

One clear purpose of this Protocol is to encourage the development
of safe alternative substances as a replacement for the ozone depleting
CFC's and halons.72 Many political, environmental, and scientific communities believe that a complete replacement of these substances is the
only absolute method of protecting the ozone layer.7 3 The chemical
manufacturing community also acknowledges the correlation between
chlorines, bromines and ozone depletion, and explains that global regulation is the only way to bring about replacements equitably, with a minimum of economic displacement.7' The Protocol may successfully
71. See N.Y.Times, Mar. 16, 1988, at YI, col.4; N.Y.Times, Mar. 20, 1988, at YI coll.
72. See Protocol, supra note 1, Resolution 2, and Articles 9 and 10.
73. See N.Y.Times, Mar. 16, 1988, at Y1, col.4; N.Y.Times, Mar. 20, 1988, at YI col.l.
Crawford, Landmark Ozone Treaty Negotiated, Vol. 237 SCIENCE 1557 (1987); Rowland,
supra note 9, at 26; Ember, supra note 9, at 37; U& Participationin Int'lNegotiationson Ozone
Protocol HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Human Rights and Int'l Organizationsof the House
Comm. on ForeignAffairs, House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 19 (1987); Ozone
Depletion, the Greenhouse Effect, and Climate Change: Joint HearingBefore the Subcomm. on
EnvironmentalProtectionand Hazardous Wastes and Toxic Substances ofthe Senate Comm. on
Environment and Public Works 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 61, 306, 310, 311 (1987) (statements of
D. Doniger, Senior Attorney for the Natural Resources Defense Council) [hereinafter Ozone
Depletion]. Some experts feel that manufacturers stand to gain a competitive advantage from
such a strict regulation. See Bleicher, An Overview of Int'l EnvironmentalRegulation, 2 ECoLOGY L. Q. 1, 78 (1972).
74. One of the largest achievements to date in protecting the ozone layer was the an-
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accomplish this complete replacement if its provisions effectively force
manufacturers to develop and use alternative substances. 7"

1. Control Measures for CFC's
The control measures for CFC's, versus halons, are more stringent
because these chemicals constitute the majority of emissions at this time.
Protocol Article 2 calls for a gradual reduction of both consumption and

production of the controlled substances over an 8 year period. These
control measures for CFC's demand, based on 1986 levels of consump-

tion and production: a freeze in consumption, and a freeze or a limit of a
10 percent increase in production to begin by 1990; a 20 percent reduction in consumption, and a 20 percent or 10 percent reduction in production to begin in 1993; and further reductions of 30 percent in
consumption, and 30 percent or 15 percent in production by 1998.76
These measures are the fundamental regulatory provisions of this Proto-

col and, at best, provide for final reductions by 50 percent of consumption and production of these substances by 1998.
2.

Problems with CFC Control Measures

From the perspective of regulatory policy and incentives, these reduction figures fail to effectuate a strong goal of the Protocol -

stance replacement."

sub-

The control measure figures will not necessarily

cause manufacturers to develop alternative substances because a produc-

tion and consumption freeze can easily be obtained, and requires no replacement substances be developed. Many parties can meet their
nouncement by the world's largest producer of CFC's and halons, E.I duPont de Nemours &
Co., that they expected to completely phase out manufacture of these substances by sometime
near the turn of the century. This dramatic change in position came after the release of the
March 16 NASA ozone study. N.Y.Times, Mar. 16, 1988, at Y1, col.4. See also Barnett,
Ozone Protection: The Need for a Global Solution, 12 EPA JOURNAL No. 10, at 10 (1986),
Producers like duPont say that marketable substitutes for some CFC's could be produced In
five years. See Ember, supra note 9, at 48, 52.
75. See Thomas, Global Challenges at EPA, 12 EPA JOURNAL No. 10, at 2,3 (1986)(Administrator of EPA calls for technology-forcing regulations); U.S. Dept. of State, supra note
19, at 1-4.
76. See Protocol, supra note 1, Article 2 paras. 1, 3, and 4. The factors affecting the
production reduction figures are addressed in section (B) of this Note regarding lesser developed nations, and in section (D) discussing concessions made to the Soviet Union,
77. The issue of the quantity of production and consumption reductions under the Protocol, 50% in a best case scenario, has been and will be discussed primarily as supplemental
information. The necessity for complete elimination of these substances is becoming blindingly
clear with the accumulation of new information, and the Protocol contains provisions by
which these reduction figures can be altered. Protocol provisions causing substance replacement are still important from a theoretical standpoint for future environmental agreements.
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obligations under the Protocol by simply eliminating nonessential uses, 78
leaving enough production to cover demand from applications that
would otherwise require development of alternative substances.7 9 To effectively cause a technology change the Protocol should require drastic

reductions in production and consumption of these substances. For example, an 85 percent reduction obligation would clearly cause the manufacturers of these substances to develop alternatives."0

Another problem with the control measures in Article 2 of the Protocol is that the economic burden posed by the Protocol (of alternative
substance development, and of substance reduction) is not equally distributed among all parties. The open structure of the control measures
allows each party to choose where to make reductions." This option
insures that the least economically disruptive applications will be

targeted for reductions.82 However, the relative economic burdens on
parties to meet their obligations will be disparate because parties are at

various stages of use, or disuse of the controlled substances. For inof CFC's in aerosols. 83

stance, the U.S. has banned nonessential use
Therefore, further reductions will have to be made in areas where alter-

natives are not readily available. The European Economic Community

(EEC) countries, in contrast, still use CFC's in aerosols." To meet their
burden under the Protocol, these countries may only need to replace
78. Certain applications of these substances can be deemed nonessential in that viable
replacement technology currently exists. CFC use as propellants for aerosols is a prime example. In the United States, non-CFC propellants are currently in use as well as the manual
propelling of liquid products. Convention Resolution 2, para. 6, and Protocol Resolution I
recognize the concept of nonessential use reductions. See Ember, supra note 9, at 50 (this is
called a "specific use" ban and is disfavored by the European Economic Community); D.
Dudek, ChlorofluorocarbonPolicy: Choices & Consequences 3 (April, 1987) (available through
the Environmental Defense Fund).
79. This prediction is based on free market economics, and will have to be borne out with
time. However, it is clear that the production reduction, particularly if it is actually only 35%,
is closer to a nonessential use ban than it is to a mandate for comprehensive substitutes.
Global CFC use as propellants for aerosols, an application with simple alternative methods, is
roughly 31% of total CFC consumption, very close to the pessimistic CFC production reduction obligation. See Miller and Mintzer, supra note 6, at 14; Crawford, United States Floats
Proposalto Help Prevent Global Ozone Depletion, 234 ScIENcE 927.
80. See U.S. Dept. of State, supra note 19, at 3; Ozone Depletion, supra note 74, at 306.
81. Various other approaches to broad regulation of substances are available, although the
production and consumption based regulation seem to be the most flexible for the participants.
Other methods would be emission reduction technology on specific plants, emission fees, or
marketable permits for emissions. See D. Dudek, supra note 78, at 11-17.
82. See Miller and Mintzer, supra note 6, at 21; Ember, supra note 9, at 49.
83. 21 C.F.R. § 2.125 (1978).
84. The EEC uses over 50% of their CFC production in aerosols. Chlorofluorocarbon
Production and Use Data, EPA Unofficial Document (unpublished, unavailable confidential
document produced for EPA).
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CFC's in aerosols with hydrocarbons, or employ manual mechanisms as
a replacement for propellants,"5 at a relatively low economic cost,8 6
The inequality in economic burdens could be resolved if the Proto-

col eliminated all nonessential uses of the controlled substances.8 7 This
approach would have three advantages over the current Protocol measures. First, there would be an immediate and substantial reduction in
emissions.8 8 Second, all parties would approach their obligations under
the Protocol on an equal level.8 9 Third, if faced with equal difficulty all
parties would have a greater incentive to work together in developing
alternative substances.
3. Halon Control. Measures
Halons are regulated separately from CFC's in -paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Protocol. Halon use in mass production began in the 1970s. 90

The increase in use of halons 1211 and 1301 has averaged 10.5 percent
annually,9 1 with unregulated use expected to double by the turn of the
85. See Barnett, supra note 74.
86. This disparity may also raise difficult economic problems in the relative pricing of
goods: if a country can use CFC's for a product because it has cut back in nonessential use
areas, it may be able to undercut countries like the U.S., who are using expensive substitutes
for the same product. See Note, Int'l Trade Implications of Pollution Control, 58 CORNELL L.
REv. 368, at 371, 375 (1973). See also D. Gushee, supra note 64, at 8-9. This report was
funded by the Alliance for a Responsible CFC Policy, compiled by Putnam, Hayes, & Bartlett,
Inc. (May 13, 1987).
87. This idea has two branches, economic and semantic. Economically the nonessential
use argument makes clear sense, as illustrated by the argument in the accompanying text,
However, semantically it is difficult for parties to agree to such an argument because "nonessential use" is a term of art. This point was discussed in negotiations on the Protocol and,
for example, the Europeans would point to American automobile air conditioners as "nonessential" whenever the Americans pointed at aerosol propellants as "nonessential."
88. See United Nations EnvironmentalProgramme,Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and
Technical Expertsfor the Preparationof a Protocolon Chlorofluorocarbonsto the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Geneva (hereinafter Ad Hoc Working Group) at
2,5,7, UNEP/WG.172/2 (May 8,1987) (Official UNEP, U.S., and Swiss statements calling for
swift reductions in emissions).
89. An initial nonessential use regulation would pose a structural problem for the Protocol as it would be a reduction in consumption apart from the consumption reductions already
implanted in the Protocol. However, a short annex of applications deemed nonessential could
be developed and added as part of the Protocol, and standard consumption reductions could be
in addition to this initial reduction.
90. The Importanceof Including Halons in the InternationalProtocol,Draft Submission to
the Ad Hoc Working Group on Ozone Layer Protocol, at 1 (Sept. 1987) (unpublished document, maybe available through UNEP) (hereinafter Importance of Halons). See also Crawford, supra note 73,, at 928; Assessment of the Risk, supra note 9, at 12. Note that
measurements of halon 1211 and 1301 particle content in the anarctic air has shown an annual
growth average of 23%. Importance of Halons, supra at 1.
91. Id.
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93
century.92 Because halons have the greatest capacity to destroy ozone,

they account for approximately 16 percent of ozone depletion even
though they only represent a small percentage of actual emissions. 4
Article 2, paragraph 2 of the Protocol, the only regulatory measure

governing halons, calls for freezing consumption at 1986 levels, as well as
freezing or limiting increase in production to 10 percent of 1986 production. 95 The Protocol specifies no further measures or graduated reductions for future control of these substances. Moreover, paragraph 2
states that "[t]he mechanism for implementing these measures shall be
decided by the parties at their first meeting ... .",96
The Protocol's relative neglect in regulating halons, as compared to
CFC's, is disturbing. 97 Halons should be regulated under the same, or
more stringent regulatory standards than CFC's because halons are the
most volatile ozone depleters, are new in industrial applications, and

have ready replacements. Moreover, halons should be subject to the
same implementation mechanism that will be applied to CFC's, rather
than having an unnecessary additional mechanism for implementing con-

trol measures. The separate implementation mechanism for halon production and consumption causes unneccesary and unexplained
uncertainty and complication because parties will spend valuable time at

the reconvening, confronting a provision that, simply, should be identical
to that for CFC's.
B.

Article 5, Special Situation of Developing Countries

Article 5 of the Protocol states, in part, that "[a]ny Party that is a

developing country and whose annual calculated level of consumption of
92. See Crawford, supra note 73, at 928; Assessment of the Risk, supra note 9, at 12.
93. Estimated ozone depleting potential ratios describe the potential of each chemical to
destroy ozone molecules. As listed in theAnnex, they are: halon-1211 = 3.0, halon-1301 =
10.0, CFC-11 = 1.0, CFC-12 = 1.0, CFC-113 = 0.8, CFC-114 = 1.0, CFC-115 = 0.6.
Protocol, supra note 1, Annex A.
94. See Ad Hoc Working Group, supra note 88, at 10, UNEP/WG. 167/2 (March 4, 1987)
(This percentage represents the ozone depletion of the two regulated halons combined, taking
into account their weighted ODP values.)
95. Protocol, supra note 1, Article 2 para. 2. These regulatory measures are subject to
change, as discussed in section (E) of this Note.
96. rd.
97. In discussing its proposed rulemaking implementing the Montreal Protocol, EPA
states, "the Protocol's different treatment of CFCs and halons reasonably reflects differences in
what is known about the ozone depletion potential of the two classes of chemicals and the
volume of their respective emissions." EPA Final Rule, supra note 67, at 47,498. Given the
rate of growth in the use of halons, and their ozone destruction capacity of 3 and 10 times that
of most CFC's, it is incorrect to say that halons can safely be emitted into the atmosphere
without reduction.
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the controlled substances is less than 0.3 kilograms per capita" is entitled
to Article 5 status under the Protocol.9" This concession permits developing countries to delay compliance with the Article 2 control measures
for 10 years after the Protocol comes into force. 99 it also provides that
these parties can calculate their base year consumption for regulation by
using their average consumption levels during the period from 1995-1997
inclusive, or 0.3 kilos per capita, whichever is smaller.'10 Regular parties
to the Protocol, on the other hand, base their consumption on 1986
levels. Therefore, these developing countries may, inthe ten-year delay
period, substantially increase their consumption, and correlatively their
emissions, which could readily offset any reductions by industrialized nations. 101 This provision effectively allows the developing countries to begin complying with the Protocol at a consumption rate substantially
higher than they now maintain. These concessions exist to allow lesser
developed nations to participate in the Protocol. 102 The developing nations individually contribute only a small portion of total global emissions, and without the concessions it would be difficult for them to afford
10 3
the initial expensive alternative costs.
Although Article 5 is an important and useful method of encouraging the participation of developing nations in the Protocol, it is not without flaws. As it is currently written, Article 5 will allow and possibly
encourage developing countries to increase their consumption by approximately 50 percent." ° In the aggregate these nations consume approximately 367 million pounds of CFC's annually, contributing roughly 16.1
percent of global CFC emissions.10 5 Allowing a 50 percent increase,
therefore, can mean an additional 168.5 million pounds of CFC's emitted
that, under a stronger agreement, would not be emitted. This potential
98. Protocol, supra note 1, Article 5 para. 1.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Ozone Layer Depletion: HearingBefore the Subcomm. On Health and the Environment of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 237,
(1987)(hereinafter Ozone Layer Depletion)(statement of D. Dudek, Senior Economist at the
Environmental Defense Fund, that because 80% of the world's population is in lesser developed countries, allowing them to increase their consumption could bffset any reductions from
the industrialized nations.) See also infra text accompanying notes 103, 104.
102. See Protocol, supra note 1, Preamble.
103. See Ad Hoc Working Group, supra note 88, at 13.
104. The Article 5 limit on consumption is 0.3 kilos per capita and approximate consumption in these nations averages 0.2 kilos per capita. Therefore, to reach the 0.3 kilo limit, these
countries can increase their consumption by 50%. D. Gushee, supra note 64, at 8. Consump.
tion figures for Article 5 parties are very rough as no clear data on their per capita consumption rates exist.
105. N.Y.Times, Mar. 21, 1988, at Y1l, col.5.
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increase may ultimately undermine the efficacy of the Protocol. To respect the spirit of the Protocol even developing countries' consumption
figures should be kept as low as possible because consumption figures
translate directly into emissions entering the atmosphere. 1)6
One difficulty with the Article 5 provisions are the terms that define
a party in that class. Article 5 status may be held as long as a party is a
"developing country," uses the controlled substances for their "basic domestic needs,"10 7 and consumes the substances at a rate not exceeding
0.3 kilos per capita per year.10 8 There is no provision, however, that
defines "basic domestic needs.""Ico Semantically, this phrase would seem
to limit the use of the controlled substances to necessary domestic consumption. Without an express definition, however, this phrase is open to
interpretation. A country may argue that many "uses" fall under "basic
domestic needs."' 110 This phrase may also be construed to include domestic economic needs, which could cover all aspects of the economy,
including production of goods for export. Under a broad definition of
"basic domestic needs," Article 5 countries could use or consume controlled substances in the production of goods for export. Without an
express definition of "basic domestic needs," Article 5 countries will have
a much greater incentive to consume these controlled substances since in
a lesser developed country the export market's potential for economic
wealth is much greater than a strict domestic market. This is particularly true when the use of the controlled substances is being restricted,
creating a disparity between the cost of the expensive alternative methods
and the cheaper controlled substances. "I
106. This Protocol regulates through both production and consumption restrictions. Production regulations are the easiest to enforce, but may work to discriminate against importing
parties as prices will rise considerably under sole production restrictions. Consumption regulations protect importing parties by cutting consumption along with production, thereby generally ensuring equal supply and demand. Article 5 countries consume and may produce these
substances. For analytical purposes, the two types of regulations will not be distinguished since
they both lead to emissions the Protocol is striving to reduce. See generally Dudek, supra note
78; ExplanatoryNote by the Executive Directorof UNEPfor the PreparatoryMeetingin MontreaL 8-11 Sept. 1987, to Deal with the Outstanding Problems on the Draft Protocol on
Chlorofluorocarbonsto the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, (unpublished document, available through UNEP).
107. Protocol, supra note 1, Article 5 para.l.
108. Id.
109. See generally, Protocol supra note 1.'
110. The legislative history of this Protocol seems to approve of these countries increasing
their consumption up to the established limits, and not providing for cautious increases as
would result from a strict definition of "basic domestic needs." See generally,Ad Hoc Morking
Group, supra note 88.
111. This disparity will create a strong profit margin, thereby encouraging Article 5 countries to exploit the opportunity. See Dudek, supra note 78, at 20.
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The privileged treatment that Article 5 parties receive further undermines the purpose of the Protocol. First, Article 2 allows industrialized parties to produce these controlled substances for the benefit of
Article 5 parties, which guarantees a ready-made supply in times of a
general decrese in supply. 12 Second, Article 5 parties are given the option to produce controlled substances domestically from existing facilities, or developing new facilities. Finally, there are no provisions that
restrict Article 5 parties from buying technology to produce controlled
substances.1 13 As a result of this special treatment, Article 5 parties will
actually have an economic incentive to use such products, and to
purchase older technology at a time when non-Article 5 parties must
reduce their use of such compounds and expend money to develop alternative technologies. These privileges will encourage Article 5 parties to
consume up to their maximum rate of 0.3 kilos per capita.
There is a solution to this problem. The incentive to use the controlled substances for export goods should be eliminated by limiting the
term "basic domestic needs" to mean "for use in non-export, basic domestic markets only." This requirement would limit Article 5 parties to
use of the controlled substances for their smaller domestic markets.
Moreover, the Protocol should also provide a clear provision preventing
Article 5 nations from building new facilities to produce controlled substances between now and the period when the control measures of Article 2 applied to them become effective. Since the substances are available
from non-Article 5 parties, such new facilities are unnecessary, will create economic dependance upon production from the plants, and will
eventually become obsolete under the Protocol provisions as production
is reduced over time.
A final flaw in Article 5 of the Protocol concerns the impact on the
reductions to be achieved by Article 2. The control measures in Article 2
allow for an increase in production above the regulated reduction for the
relevant period if such increase is to "satisfy the basic domestic needs of
112. This production also undercuts the initial Article 2 reduction control measures from,
for example, 50% reduction of production to only a 35% reduction. The difference of 15% is
exported to Article 5 parties if they need it.
113. Article 2 paragraph 6 prevents production from plants on line, after September 16,
1987 from being added into base production figures unless plants are completely constructed
by Dec. 31, 1990 and total consumption does note exceed 0.5 kilograms per capita. However,
this paragraph expressly applies only to "any party not operating under Article 5." Therefore,
Article 5 parties could produce the substances as long as their per capita consumption does not
exceed 0.3 kilos per capita. In drafting the Protocol, Article 5 parties rejected a proposal which
guaranteed them a supply of the substances (as Article 2 does now), but prevented them from
producing these substances. See Crawford, supra note 73, at 1557.
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the parties operating under Article 5." 114 This potential increase in production affects the regulatory control measures in the following manner:
(1) paragraph 1 calls for a freeze of annual CFC consumption and production at 1986 levels from August 1989 through June 1993, with the
possibility of increasing production by 10 percent above that level, or a
net effect of a 10 percent increase in production;1 1 5 (2) paragraph 3 calls
for a 20 percent reduction of annual CFC consumption and production
of 1986 levels from July 1993 through June 1998, with the possibility of
increasing production by 10 percent, or a net reduction for that period of
10 percent; 1 6 (3) paragraph 4 calls for a 50 percent reduction of annual
CFC consumption and production of 1986 levels from July 1998 through
the duration, with the possibility of exceeding that limit by 15 percent of
1986 levels, or a final net reduction of 35 percent; I 7 and (4) paragraph 2
calls for a freeze of halon consumption and production at 1986 levels
from February 1992 through the duration, with the possibility of increasing production by 10 percent above that level, or a net effect of allowing a
11
10 percent increase in halon production. 8
As a result, the Article 5 concessions may cause the net reduction in
global production of CFC's to be as low as 35 percent, and actually increase the global production of halons by 10 percent. In fact, the incentive for the non-Article 5 parties to meet the "needs" of the Article 5
parties is great because it allows them to keep plants and equipment operating at a high capacity during a time of reductions. The lack of definition for "basic domestic needs," may allow Article 5 parties to become
"laundering facilities" for non-Article 5 production of controlled substances.'1 9 This situation may occur because the Protocol contains no
provisions limiting trade between parties except for requiring that the
trade be used for the "basic domestic needs" of that party. Again, the
114. Protocol, supra note 1, Article 2 paras. 1-4. The Working Group on control measures
for the Protocol believed that any emission concessions given to the developing countries
should be compensated by lower consumption in the developed nations. However, the Protocol did not provide for any such provisions. See Ad Hoc Working Group, supra note 88, at 32.
115. Protocol, supra note 1, Article 2 para. 1. The dates mentioned in the text accompanying footnotes 115-118 of this Note represent the earliest possible dates for the restrictions to
take effect, assuming that the Protocol comes into force on schedule. See Protocol, supra note
1, Article 16 for requirements for entry into force of the Protocol.
116. Protocol, supra note 1, Article 2, at para. 3.
117. Id. at para. 4.
118. Id. at para. 2.
119. See Dudek, supra note 78, at 20. ("ITnhere will also be new incentives to cheat or
subvert the control system to profit illegally from this enhanced value.") Non-Article 5 parties
can export to Article 5 parties, who, in turn, can apply the chemicals to products and send
these around the globe, perhaps even back to the original exporting country.
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answer to this problem is a very strict definition of -the term "basic domestic needs." This definition would prevent any export of controlled
substances to Article 5 parties if these parties would use these substances
to produce products for export.
C. Article 4, Control of Trade With Non-Parties
While parties are reducing their production and consumption under
the Protocol, non-parties should be excluded from trading with parties in
these substances. Experts agree that the banning of imports of these
substances from nonparties is essential to protect the economic entities of
the parties and to effectively maximize the global emissions reductions
under the Protocol. 120
The Protocol clearly addresses direct trade of the controlled substances with nonparties. Article 4 paragraph 1 bans the import of bulk
substances from nonparties within one year after the :Protocol comes into
force.121 Article 3 paragraph (c) is effective in dealing with exports to
nonparties by requiring that exports are calculated into that party's consumption figure, thereby directly reducing the amount that the party can
consume under the Protocol. These provisions will help protect party
economies and lower nonparty emissions.
The Protocol also contains provisions to regulate indirect trade with
nonparties. This trade is crucial to lowering global emissions since a substantial amount of the controlled substances are used in producing goods
for export, which are nct regulated under the bulk substances trade restriction of Article 4.122 However, the applicable provisions, because of

their complexity, may not be as effective as the other trade restriction
provisions in protecting the ozone layer. The Protocol's definition of
controlled substances excludes any, "substance or mixture which is in a
manufactured product other than a container used for the transportation
or storage of the substance listed." 123 Trade in goods that contain the
120. See Dudek, supra note 78, at 21; Ad Hoc Working Group, supra note 88, at 32;
Bleicher, supra note 73, at 86; Note, supra note 86, at 375.
121. Article 4 prohibits import of "controlled substances," which is defined in Article 1
para. 4 as "a substance listed in Annex A to this Protocol, whether existing alone or in a
mixture." This prohibition applies to bulk shipments of the controlled substances, and not to
products that contain or use the controlled substances in production. Bulk substance imports
from nonparties would be accounted for, as it would be added into the consumption equation
for the importing party.
122. See Ozone Layer Depletion, supra note 101, at 243-44. (D. Dudek, Senior Economist
at the Environmental Defense Fund explains the importance of strict trade control, particularly of products made with these substances.)
123. Protocol, supra Article 1 para. 4.
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substances as part of their makeup," or goods that are made with the
substances, but that do not contain them in the end, 125 are not subject to
the nonparty trade restrictions in paragraph 1 of Article 4. Article 4
paragraphs 3 and 4 attempt to regulate this indirect trade of the controlled substances. Both paragraphs, however, undercut the potential of
the Protocol because they are unwieldy, allow for reservations, and ultimately encourage nonparty production and emission of the controlled
1 26
substances in manufacturing certain trade products.
Article 4 paragraph 3 requires the parties to develop, in an annex, a
list of products containing the controlled substances. Paragraph 4 calls
for an annex of products produced with, but not containing the controlled substances. 2 7 These annexes of specific consumer products are to
be used to regulate, or restrict trade of these products. Both paragraphs
require the parties to meet and create the annexes for the respective products, and to amend the annexes to the Protocol according to Article 10 of
the Convention.' 2 8 These annexes must be adopted by at least two-thirds
of the parties in a vote.' 29 Once adopted, the annexes must be accepted,
ratified or approved individually by each party, and will 30then enter into
1
force only after two-thirds of the parties have so acted.
This elaborate procedure increases the difficulty of having such an
annex actually enter into force. The parties must negotiate a new annex
for the Protocol and follow through with each party ratifying the annex
individually. Moreover, if any party does not ratify the annex, that party
13 1
will not be bound by the annex listing if and when it enters into force.
The Protocol provisions pertaining to indirect trade could be more
effectively drafted. Since the products that will be regulated under these
paragraphs are known at this time 132 they could be listed in the Protocol
124. Refrigerators, automobile or stationary air conditioners, aerosol spray cans, and fire
extinguishers are a few examples of these products. See. Ozone Depletion,supra note 73, at 157.
In 1985, 3.78 million pounds of CFC-12 came into the U.S. via imported automobile air conditioners alone. Another 350,000 pounds came into the U.S. via light trucks. Id. at 158. In 1986
one million pounds of CFC-12 came into the country via imported refrigerators and freezers.

Id.
125. Foam pads, various insulation materials, egg carton containers, and microchips are
examples of these products. Id. at 158-59.
126. See Ozone Layer Depletion, supra note 101, at 243-44.
127. Protocol, supra note 1, Article 4.
128. Id paras. 3, 4.

129. Convention, supra note 1 Article 10.
130. Id.

131. Id para. 2(b), (c). See text between infra notes 133-34.
132. The applications of these substances in industry are limited in number and commonly
known. See generally Miller and Mintzer, supra note 6 at 3-9. Most of the authorities listed
supra note 9 discuss the common applications of these compounds.
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itself. Then, after entry into force of the Protocol, these products would
be automatically excluded from trade with nonparties.113 This procedure
would insure that certain products, commonly known to lead to large
emissions, would cease to be importable, and would put nonparties on
notice of their products' export status. It would also force reduction of
emissions from nonparties to the Protocol because they could only access
certain markets if they stopped employing these substances.
Another problem with the annex provisions is created by the clause
in Article 4 paragraphs 3 and 4, which states: "Parties that have not objected to the annex in accordance with those procedures shall ban, within
one year of the annex having become effective, the import of those products from any state not party to this Protocol" (emphasis added). The
procedures referred to are in Article 10 paragraphs 2(b) and 2(c) of the
Convention and provide that parties who are "unable to approve" of the
annex will not be bound by it once it comes into force, provided that they
have given written notice. Neither the Protocol nor the Convention describe what criteria justify an acceptable objection to any proposed annex
under paragraphs 3 or 4 of Article 2. The Protocol is also unclear as to
whether a party may object to only some, or must object to all of the
products listed in the annex. Therefore, any party may object to the proposed annex, and thereby, be able to import products from nonparties.
The economic balance between parties, which is crucial to such an economically volatile and precarious agreement, may be threatened if one
party ignores the banning of a certain product that other parties have
obligated themselves to accept. 134 More importantly, this type of reservation creates an incentive for nonparties to produce products that use
these substances; which obviously runs contrary to the Protocol's goals.
Prior drafts of the Protocol did not contain a provision allowing
objections to proposed annexes. Objections became possible by the incorporation of Con.ention Article 10 into Article 4 of the Protocol. 135 Parties should not be allowed to object to annexes of products. As
133. This approach was advocated as an alternative for products containing controlled substances in early drafts of the Protocol. See 7th Revised Draft Protocol, at 6, UNEP/IG.79/3,
July 15, 1987; see also 7th Revised Draft Protocol, at 5, UNEP/IG.79/3/Rev.1, August 12,
1987 (both documents available through UNEP.) It would be possible to establish a certification procedure whereby nonparties could verify that their product was manufactured without
the controlled substance, and then allow them to export to parties.
134. See Dudek, supra note 78, at 21. See also 52 Fed.Reg. 239, at 47, 498 (Dec. 14, 1987),
("For the Protocol to be effective, nations cannot pick and choose which of its provisions to
implement.")
135. This provision is basically a reservation clause, and was added to the Protocol during
the last week of negotiations. See 7th Revised Draft Protocols: UNEP/IG.79/3, July 15, 1987;
UNEP/IG.79/3/Rev.1, August 12, 1987; UNEP/IG.79/3/Rev.1 PS./CRP/9/Rev.l, Sept.
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demonstrated above, such inconsistent participation is unnecessary, and
will upset the fragile economic balance established under the Protocol. If
a party has valid grounds for wanting unrestrained access to certain
products, such as those necessary for medical applications or those of
vital economic importance, these necessities would probably be respected
during negotiations of the annexes. An alternative approach would be to
allow objections, but only for specified reasons, such as those listed
above.
A final difficulty with the indirect trade control annexes stems from
paragraph 4 of Article 4 of the Protocol, which states: "Whe Parties
shall determine the feasibility of banning or restricting... the import of
products produced with, but not containing.. ." (emphasis added). The
language of paragraph 4 makes a ban of these products even more difficult because the parties must agree that such an annex is "feasible"
before they can begin to list products to be excluded from trade.1 36 The
annex procedure is already cumbersome and provides for what are effectively reservations to escape obligations. This feasibility requirement is
unnecessary and creates another hurdle to developing an annex. Because
the large emitters in this product category are known, an annex should
have been developed and incorporated into the Protocol as signed in September of 1987.
Another flaw in Article 4 of the Protocol is evident when one acknowledges that elimination of further development of, and economic
dependance upon, controlled substances is a major purpose of the Protocol. 1 37 Article 5 paragraph 5 of the Protocol attempts to thwart transfer
of technology for substance development to nonparties. Article 4 paragraph 6 addresses economic aid going to nonparties for use in production
and application of the substances. These provisions, however, are structurally weak. Under paragraph 5 parties are to "discourage" export of
such technology, and paragraph 6 asks parties to "refrain" from such
1 38
investments.
These standards are merely vague policy goals, not clear rules. The
present standards can be contrasted with the first two drafts of the 7th
Revised Draft Protocol which stated: "Parties shall not conclude new
agreements to provide to States not Party to this Protocol... subsidies,
10, 1987; UNEP/IG.79/3/Rev.2, Sept. 11, 1987, and; UNEP/IG.79/3/Rev.3, Sept. 12, 1987
(all Drafts available through UNEP).
136. The 7th Revised Draft Protocols all included this feasibility requirement for the
annex.
137. See Ad Hoc Working Group, supra note 88, at 14.
138. Protocol, supra note 1, Article 4 paras. 5, 6.
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aid, credits.., for the export of products, equipment, plants, or technology for producing the controlled substances."'139 Regarding technology
export, a U.S. proposed Protocol read: "[E]ach Party shall ban: ... the
export of technologies to the territory of non-parties .. .(and) direct
investment in facilities in the territory of non-parties ... for producing
fully-halogenated alkanes. ' ' 14° This proposed language is straightforward and makes it easy to determine if the rule has been violated.
As demonstrated earlier, the lack of clear and definite language is a
major problem with the Protocol. Due to the failure of the indirect trade
restriction provisions of Article 4, paragraphs 3 and 4, nonparties may be
able to export products that involve these substances to party nations.
Additionally, nonparties may be able to obtain the technology, and possibly even the financing to produce the substances because of the weak
language in Article 4 paragraphs 5 and 6. Such consequences may ultimately contribute to subversion of the Protocol's goals.
D.

Article 2, Paragraph 6 Concessiois for Facilities in Construction

During the final negotiations of the Protocol in Montreal, a concession was carved out to guarantee participation by the Soviet Union. 141
Article 2 paragraph 6 of the Protocol states that if a facility was under
construction or contracted for, prior to signing the Protocol on September 16, 1987, or if the construction was provided for in national legislation before January 1, 1987, will be completed by the end of 1990, and
will not raise per capita consumption above 0.5 kilos, then the production of that plant may be added to the 1986 base year production figure
for the purposes of the Protocol.
This provision was clearly inserted to allow the Soviet Union to finish the construction of, and to utilize two CFC manufacturing plants that
they are depending on in their current five year economic development
plan.142 Information regarding the specific plants is difficult to obtain,
'
but sources vary from calling the CFC plants "small," 143
to saying the
provision allows the USSR's "base level (production) to be increased
about 25 percent from 1986 levels." 1" The Soviet Union is believed to
139. See 7th Revised Draft Protocols: UNEP/IG.79/3, at 7, July 15, 1987; UNEP/IG.79/
3/Rev.l, at 6, August 12, 1987 (available through UNEP).
140. See Ozone Depletion, supra note 73, at 142.
141. See Wash. Post, Sept. 16, 1987, at Al; Wash. Post, Sept. 17, 1987, at A3 col, 4. In
the last Revised Draft Protocol there was no such provision in Article 2. 7th Revised Draft
Protocol, Article 2, UNEP/IG.79/3/Rev.3, Sept. 12, 1987 (available through UNEP),
142. See Crawford, supra note 73, at 1557.
143. Id.
144. See D. Gushee, supra note 64, at 8.
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produce approximately 10 percent of the world's CFC's, although they
consume less than that amount. 145 Based on global average production, 4' the Soviet Union produces approximately 94 million kg/year.
Thus, if production of CFC's are increased by 25 percent, the Soviet
Union may add approximately 23.5 million kilograms to their 1986 base
year production figure. This substantial addition to base year production
tacitly undermines the reduction figures of Article 2 because the Soviet
Union's base figures are artificially inflated by paragraph 6. Therefore,
the final reduction amount under Article 2 paragraph 4 will have to be
adjusted to account for the extra emissions added by the Soviet Union.
Based on the above figures, global production reductions could be offset
by 2.5 percent, from, for example, 35 percent reductions to 32.5 percent.147 This represents effective reductions, taking into account CFC's
that would otherwise not have come into existence.
The concession seems justified since the Soviet Union probably
would not have joined the Protocol without it.148 Absent participation
by such a large producer of these substances, the Protocol would be far
less effective. The parties, however, could have bargained, or requested
that the Soviets: (1) commit to employing the best recapturing, or recycling technology available on the new plants; 149 (2) not export substances from the new facilities, but use them strictly for domestic needs;
or (3) have them take older plants with equivalent production off-line, so
as to minimize emissions.
E. Adjustment Procedures for Control Measures
With the development of environmental regulation and, in particular, with laws regulating international environmental issues, it is essential
that procedures exist for modifying regulatory control measures. Modification may be necessary because environmental regulation is based on
145. Wash. Post, Sept. 16, 1987, at Al.
146. Global production in 1985 was roughly 940 million kg/yr. See Ad hoc Jorking Group,
supra note 88, at 13.
147. 940 kg/yr + 23.5 (added by USSR) = 63.5 (estimated 1986 adjusted global production). With a 35% reduction under the Protocol, emissions would be 626.28 kg/yr. Without
the concession for the Soviets, global production would be 940 x .65 = 611 kg/yr. The difference, 15.28 kg/yr., is artificial, and (15.28/611=2.5%) represents 2.5% greater production
than should have existed.
148. Wash. Post, Sept. 17, 1987, at A3 col. 4.
149. See Dudek, supra note 78 at 3; see, e.g., Clean Air Act, New Source Performance
Standards, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1986), which requires new, or modified air pollution emitting
facilities in certain areas of the U.S. to employ the best technology available to reduce emissions that may be reasonably harmful to human health. This type of technology should be
developed and applied to CFC production facilities.
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scientific data and research that is constantly evolving. The regulatory
measures must be flexible enough to compensate for new findings. Ironically, this point is alarmingly true in the case of the Montreal Protocol.
As stated earlier, the Protocol was an active response to a perceived
threat of ozone depletion, although the extent of the danger was not precisely known at the time of the signing of the Protocol. The discovery of
present substantial harm to the ozone layer (up to 6 percent depletion in
populated latitudes for some periods) 150 only six months following the
signing of the Protocol indicates how important this flexibility is to such
an international environmental regulatory treaty. For the Protocol to be
effective and not become obsolete, it must be able to regulate new substances, or modify regulation on existing substances upon discovery of
new information such as that issued in March of 1988.151
Article 2 paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Protocol set forth the mechanisms for adjusting three critical variables of the Protocol: the ozone depletion rates for each substance, the consumption and production
reduction rates for the parties, and the addition to, or deletion from the
list of controlled substances in the Annex to the Protocol. It is essential
that these adjustment mechanisms exist, but it is equally essential that
they work. If they are practical and easy to use, then the Protocol can be
effective even in the face of drastic changes in the ozone layer. If the
adjustment mechanisms are rigid and difficult to use, however, the effectiveness of the Protocol will be limited by the regulatory provisions that
currently exist. For example, if the world is left with the reduction quantities presently in.the Protocol, the Protocol may quickly be found to be
obsolete.
To adjust a variable, Article 2 generally requires that the parties
meet, and either adopt or amend the adjusted variable. Regular meetings
of the parties have not yet been established, and will not be established
until the first meeting of either the Convention or the Protocol is
called. 52 At this meeting parties will set a schedule for regular meetings,
but there is no indication as to how often they will occur.153 The frequency of these meetings is important because they will be the forum for
150. See N.Y.Times, Mar. 16, 1988, at Y1, col.4; N.Y.Times, Mar. 20, 1988, at Yl, col. 1.
151. See N.Y.Times, Mar. 16, 1988, at Yl, col.4; N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1988, at Y1, coll.
152. Protocol Article 11 calls for a first meeting within one year of entry into force of the
Protocol. If the Protocol is ratified on time, the first meeting would occur by January 1990.
At this meeting the regular meeting schedule would be determined. Article 11 ties regular

meetings of the Protocol to regular meetings of the Vienna Convention. These meetings have
yet to be set because the Convention has not been ratified. See Convention, supra note 1,

Article 6, para. 1.
153. Neither Protocol Article 11, nor Convention Article 6 mentions how often, or at what
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proposals for adjustments, and actual adjustments of the control measures.' 54 If the meetings are too infrequent, the likelihood
of effective al55

teration of the control measures will decrease.1
Both adjustment provisions require adjustments to be made pursuant to Article 6, on the basis of "available scientific, environmental, technical, and economic information" which is presented to the parties by a
panel of experts appointed earlier for this specific purpose.156 This review is to be held by 1990, and "at least every four years thereafter."

The provision does not describe how the review is to be called.'" Therefore, it is possible that the review will only be held every four years if all

parties acquiesce. This review, a condition precedent to adjustment,
should instead be compelled at every regular meeting in order to suppress
the temptation to ignore obvious changes in information because of the
political and economic impact.

More controversial than the timing of regular meetings is the procedure by which adjustments are to be made. Protocol Article 2 paragraph
9 governs the adjustment of both the substance ozone depletion rate, and
the consumption and production reduction rates of Article 2 paragraphs
1-4. 's Paragraph 10 governs adjustment of the substances to be regu-

lated in Annex A.
Under paragraph 9 of Article 2, an adjustment must be assessed
pursuant to Article 6. If a consensus cannot be reached, a "two-thirds
majority vote of the parties present and voting representing at least fifty
percent of the total consumption" of the parties to the Protocol, will
bring the adjustment into force.15 9 This portion of the Protocol is effecintervals, these meetings should be held. The frequency of meetings is to be decided by the
parties at their first meeting.
154. Protocol, supra note 1, Article 11 para. 4(b),(c),(g).
155. Protocol Article 11 para. 2 allows for an "extraordinary" meeting of the parties upon
written request from any party to the Secretariat, but this requires six months notice, and, in
the interim, support by one-third of the parties. This requirement may present a problem if an
adjustment is thought very necessary by some parties, the next regular meeting is some time
away, and more than two-thirds of the parties see the adjustment as an economic inconvenience and would rather not face the issue.
156. Protocol, supra note I Article 11, para. 3(c).
157. Id. at para. 4(g). This provision provides for a review, but fails to set forth how, or by
whom, the review can be called. Under Article 12, the Secretariat's powers does not expressly
empower him to call such a review. Therefore, it must have to come about by some type of
vote at a regular meeting.
158. It is very likely that some of these figures will have to be adjusted. For example, many
of the ozone depletion rates in Annex A are not certain at this time and may need to be
adjusted upon further information. This may necessitate adjustment of the consumption or
production reduction rates.
159. Protocol, supra note 1, Article 2 para. 9(c).
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tive because it clearly states that if the above procedures are met then the
adjusted figure binds all parties to the Protocol, whether present at voting or not, and that the adjustments enter into force six months after
16°
communication from the Depositary for the Protocol.
The difficulty with these adjustments is inherent in the control measure chosen. Production and consumption caps, once set, are difficult to
adjust and tend to require considerable negotiation. 161 This is because
the caps represent a large socioeconomic upheavel and artificial alteration of market demands. Because the flexibility of the production and
consumption figures are limited by their very nature, the Protocol's ability to adjust to environmental necessity is inhibited. Thus, while the production and consumption caps are a good tool, their natural resistance to
change will be problematic for any future environmental agreement of
this nature.The adjustment provisions directed at the actual substances regulated, paragraph 10 of Article 2, raise different issues. The parties to the
Protocol have done a commendable job in listing substances known to be
most harmful to the ozone at this time. However, with new information
it may -be necessary to add to, or delete from, this list. This provision
provides a more impractical approach to virtually t:he same adjustment
need as previously addressed in paragraph 9.
The initial problem with this provision is the ambiguous procedure
for amending the Annex. 6 2 Paragraph 10(a) states that the parties may
decide to amend the Annex pursuant to a review under Article 6 of the
Protocol and following the procedure in Article 9 of the Convention.
Article 9 requires a two-thirds vote by the parties present and voting, and
then requires ratification, acceptance, or approval by two-thirds of the
parties to the Protocol before any amendment shall come into force. Paragraph 10(b), however, states: "[a]ny such decision shall become effective, provided that it has been accepted by two-thirds majority vote of the
Parties present and voting." 163 On its face, paragraph 10 of Article 2 is
160. Id. at para. 9(d).
161. See Dudek, supra note 78, at 11; Ad Hoc Working Group, supra note 88, at 10.
162. The drafters, prior to Montreal, noted this discrepancy, stating that "it does not deal
with the question of the entry into force of any changes to Annex A decided by the Parties. It
is unclear whether changes adopted by majority vote are intended to bind all Parties, or
whether the intent is that such changes would bind only Parties that have agreed to them." 7th
Revised Draft Protocol, at 5 fn. 6, UNEP/IG.79/3, July 15, 1987 (available through UNEP.)
EPA, though, has interpreted this provision to mean, "[d]ecisions under paragraph 10 become
effective when accepted by a two-thirds majority vote of the parties present and voting." 52
Fed.Reg.239, at 47, 497 (Dec.14, 1987). This interpretation flatly conflicts with the interpretation discussed in this Note.
163. Protocol, supra note 1, Article 2, para. 10(b).
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misleading. While it reads as though a two-thirds vote by the parties
present and voting is all that is required to bring an amendment to the
Annex into force, this is not the case. It is clear that paragraph 10(b) was
not intended to override the procedures set out in paragraph 10(a). First,
paragraph 10(b) states that such a decision shall become effective upon
the two-thirds vote, not that it shall enter into force, as Article 9 paragraph 5 of the Convention states. 1 Second, if the parties intended a
two-thirds vote to be the only requirement for a valid amendment, they
would not have referred to the Convention procedures at all.1 65 Third,
paragraph 10(b) completely neglects to address which parties are to be
bound by the amendment, whereas Article 9 of the Convention clearly
details which parties are to be bound.1 66 Finally, Protocol Article 11,
paragraph 4(h) says that meetings of the parties will cover "proposals for
amendment of... any annex," which is what Article 9 of the Convention
addresses, as opposed to paragraph 10(b), which if read literally would
formally adopt an amendment by two-thirds vote. Therefore, paragraph
10(a) of Article 2 is the procedural requirement to amend the Annex of
substances which requires following the cumbersome procedure of Article 9 of the Convention before the amendment will come into force.
Once this conclusion is accepted, a further difficulty arises since paragraph 5 of Article 9 of the Convention states: "Amendments adopted
... shall enter into force between Partieshavingaccepted on the ninetieth
day after the receipt by the Depositary of notification of their ratification,
approval, or acceptance... by at least two-thirds of the Parties to the
protocol concerned.. ." (emphasis added). Therefore, regulation of the
amended substances will only be binding upon those parties who formally agree to be bound. As discussed previously in this Note,16 7 the
regulation of important economic resources requires full cooperation of
all parties; allowing parties to opt-out would severely undermine the efficacy, if not the existence, of such an agreement.1 68
A final problem with paragraph 10 of Article 2 is that it fails to
164. Convention Article 9, para. 5, states that the procedures of Article 9 govern, "except
as may otherwise be provided in such Protocol." Para. 10(b) may be such a provision, but it
does not clearly, or expressly override the requirements of para. 10(a).
165. An earlier draft of the Protocol proposed a straight two-thirds vote to amend the
Annex, and did not refer to Article 9 of the Convention. See Ad Hoc Working Group, supra
note 88, at 15 para.15. It makes no sense to refer to Article 9, if para. 10(b) is to ultimately
govern the amendment process. This is supported by Protocol Article 2 para. 9, which makes
no reference to the Convention's procedures for amending the Protocol.
166. This brings up another flaw in the Protocol: who is to be bound by this amendment,
discussed supra text accompanying note 141.
167. See discussion supra text accompanying note 134.
168. See generally Dudek, supra note 78. See also, 52 Fed.Reg.239, at 47,499.
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describe how the amended substances will be controlled. Determining
the control measures for these substances is left for decision in the
amendment process, after meetings and voting.1 69 Again, leaving such a
decision for a later meeting makes the amendment process much more
difficult. It would have been less complicated to have the control provisions within the text of the Protocol. 170
The Protocol's approach to modification of the regulated substances, particularly the applicable provision, paragraph 10 of Article 2,
is difficult to use because of its ambiguities and the ratification process it
requires. To relieve this inflexibility, the Protocol could use the same
procedure that paragraph 9 of Article 2 uses to amend: two-thirds vote of
the parties present and voting, representing 50 percent of consumption. 17 1 Also, the amended substances should be governed by the regular
control measures of.the Protocol, unless, because of unforseen circumstances, the control measures need to be different. This problem could be
resolved through the Article 2 paragraph 9 procedure.
F. Efforts Beyond the Protocol
As previously explained, Article 2 sets out the control measures of
the Protocol. 172 Article 2 paragraph 11 goes one step further by allowing
any party to regulate beyond the restrictions of Article 2 if they feel additional regulation is necessary to protect the ozone layer. Article 2 paragraph 11 states: "[n]otwithstanding the provisions contained in this
Article, Parties may take more stringent measures than those required by
this Article."
The implications of this language are unclear. In one respect, the
phrase, "may take more stringent measures than those required by this
Article," (emphasis added) may limit the parties to taking more stringent
measures only with regard to the control measures in Article 2, consumption and production reductions. It may, on the other hand, be interpreted to sanction any actions by the parties that are more stringent
than the Protocol. It is important to understand the intent behind this
prdvision because further measures by parties may include import re169. .Protocol, supra note 1, Article 2 para. 10(a)(ii),
170. A solution is to have the regular control measures apply to the new substances pro
rata, upon entry into force of the amended annex. Drafters of the Protocol acknowledged this
ambiguity, but failed to develop a clean, effective response. See 7th Revised Draft Protocol, at
5 fn. 9, UNEP/IG.79/3, July 15, 1987 (available through UNEP9. If a new compound is
found to have unique properties requiring unique control provisions, then, since this would
probably be an exception to the norm, there could be a new control provision developed.
171. Protocol, supra note 1, Article 2 para. 9.
172. See discussion supra notes 72-96 and accompanying text.
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strictions that could inhibit trade with other parties to the Protocol. 73
A simple reading of the provision, "Parties may take more stringent
measures than those required by this Article," (emphasis added) logi-

cally conveys the idea that Article 2 requirements are a floor, and that
any other restrictions may be added to those requirements.1 74 If so, then
further trade restrictions, even against parties to the Protocol, would be
acceptable under the Protocol. Further, such restrictions would not violate the international General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
17 5
and therefore would be allowable under international trade law.

The flow of information on the ozone layer makes it increasingly
evident that the Protocol was merely an insurance policy, calling for in-

termediate cutbacks until further, more conclusive information was discovered.' 7 6 It is a valiant and strong effort by the international
community to protect the ozone layer. Yet it still suffers from the inherent nature of international agreements in that it is compromised to the
point of limited effectiveness.' 7 7 Unless there is a strong sense that the
parties will modify and strengthen the Protocol,' independant actions

beyond the Protocol should be undertaken in order to effectuate the goals
of the Protocol, or to accelerate the process of replacing controlled substances and thereby protecting the ozone layer.

In accordance with Article 2 paragraph 11 of the Protocol, further
action should be advocated. For example, a more stringent agreement

between a small number of committed nations,' 79 or unilateral action in
173. These restrictions would economically protect a party from another party who chose
not to regulate as stringently, and thereby gained a cost advantage over that zealous party. See
Dudek, supra note 78, at 21; Bleicher, supra note 73, at 82.
174. If the parties wanted only the consumption and production limits to be subject to
increase, they could have clearly stated it.
175. The GATT governs international trade restrictions and tries to encourage free market
trade. However, if trade restrictions are to protect "human, animal or plant life or health"
they are exempted from the GATT. See Ad Hoc Working Group,supra note 88, at 22; Bleicher,
supra note 73, at 76-78.
176. See N.Y.Times, Oct. 28, 1987, at Y9, col. 1; N.Y.Times, Oct. 1, 1987, at 1, col. 1;
San Francisco Chron., Oct. 1, 1987, at 1, col. 3.. See also official statements explaining that the
Protocol is, generally, an initial effort to solve a problem that will require further steps, supra
note 73.
177. Many parties to the Protocol arrived in Montreal with the intent to severely regulate
these substances. The Nordic countries, Australia, New Zealand, West Germany, Canada, the
U.S., and UNEP were advocating much stronger cuts than finally resulted in the Protocol. See
generally, Ad Hoc Working Group, supra note 88.
178. This is a realistic option to insufficient ozone protection and can be implemented via
paras. 9 and 10 of Article 2 of the Protocol, as discussed in section (E) of this Note.
179. Motivated industrial nations, those who produce and consume a good portion of these
substances; could enter into a more stringent agreement. Together they could substantially
reduce emissions in their own markets. By also preventing trade in certain products they
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concerned countries should be undertaken.'8 0 Short of banning all uses,
more vigorous reductions in the use of these compounds would sufficiently force development of replacement compounds, which ultimately
could solve the ozone problem. More vigorous trade restrictions, particularly in the area of indirect trade of the controlled substances, would
effectively compel parties and nonparties to develop alternatives so they
could stay in the market in these countries.'"
V. CONCLUSION
Transnational pollution, acid rain, global warming due to the greenhouse effect, global deforestation, and ozone depletion are problems facing the global community. These problems have grave implications, far
beyond merely upsetting our daily business activities or social calendars.
When we contemplate solutions to these problems, we must commit ourselves to global cooperation. Without it we, or if not us then our children, will suffer.
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
is a monumental step on the road to solving global environmental
problems. The Protocol is the first agreement to call for reduction of the
production and consumption of these economically valuable, but dangerous ozone depleting substances by all participating nations. The Protocol signifies our realization that global cooperation is the only real way to
solve problems that threaten the entire world.
This Protocol alone is not enough. As it now exists, it will not sufficiently protect the ozone layer. The industrial use of these substances
must be discontinued as soon as possible. The Protocol must be stronger,
so that all provisions and all changes bind all parties. It should be
tougher on those countries who choose not to recognize their global obligations, and the trade restrictions with nonparties must also be strengthened. Finally, the Protocol needs to be clearly committed to eventually
excluding these substances from our environment.
The Protocol is capable of protecting the ozone layer. The question
could essentially demand that other nations follow suit. The sheer size of the combined U.S.,
West German, Nordic, and Australian markets, for example, could be enough to force other
countries to develop substitutes just so they could access these markets.
180. The U.S. is actively investigating unilateral action to protect the ozone layer. The
EPA is obligated to issue a finding on ozone regulation under the Clean Air Act by August of
1988. NRDC v. Thomas, Civ. Act. No. 84-3587 (D.D.C.May 17, 1986). For a synopsis of
relatively recent U.S. legislative efforts to protect the ozone layer, see D. Gushee, supra note
64, at 11.
181. See discussion supra notes 120-39 and accompanying text.
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is whether the international community is prepared to use the Protocol
to do so. If not, then we are back to the rudiments of environmental
protection, and are left primarily with unilateral action, draconian as it
may be. The former is the answer, the latter is a band-aid.

